Is war language actually trauma language in disguise?
Why this topic? The stark title: Will the world see more wars or unrest in 2024? (See: https://theconversation.com/will-the-world-see-more-wars-or-unrest-in-2024-here-are-5-hotspots-to-watch-217807) highlighted a chilling reality: multiple active and simmering war zones across the globe. This and the alarming rise in news coverage and public discourse surrounding war, particularly in democracies and the English-speaking world, set off alarm bells, prompting this article.
Taking sides in any conflict may seem deceptively straightforward. Wars tempt us with a simple choice, but the reality is far more complex.
Both sides of any war suffer. Ultimately, nobody truly “wins”. Both sides bear the scars of violence. Extreme examples can be seen in the current tragedies unfolding, across the world. If wars are to stop, we first need to stop to think about how wars begin in the first place.
Wars might be fuelled by historical grievances, ideological clashes or resource scarcity. But wars may take hold due to other less obvious reasons, such as trauma-based factors. Might this approach broaden or even redefine our comprehension of the underlining reasons why leaders decide on war?
We need to make fewer assumptions and ask more questions.
Is our approach to war prevention too limited? Could a deeper understanding of how trauma and grief shape human behaviours provide a foundation for alternative pathways? Proactively applying and integrating this knowledge prior to conflict, not just in its aftermath, could not only broaden our understanding of the war landscape, but also contribute significantly to future war prevention strategies. Specifically, the current approach to understanding the decision to go to war often oversimplifies the causal factors. By reinterpreting, reassessing, and re-configuring the “theatre of war” to include the psychological dimensions of trauma and grief, this article aims to generate alternative, pre-conflict options for preventing war.
Trauma and grief are twin themes deeply relevant to wars (e.g., Hunt, 2010; Åhäll & Gregory, 2015). While acknowledging the significant relevance of the potent role of grief, for the sake of brevity this article will prioritise exploring the potential of trauma awareness in understanding and preventing war.
Employing Stoessinger’s (2010) ‘Why Nations Go To War’ through the lens of Vreÿ’s (2011) analysis may yield valuable insights for a potential trauma-informed reference system.
Vreÿ refers to things like moderates doing coalition-building, despite a reduction in political benefits, as a political alternative to war. Other possible reasons why men go to war is that aggressors are simply understood as political and military thugs, with soldiers and their leaders being brought to justice. In WW1 almost a generation of Europe’s young men were annihilated as a result of weak and often careless decisions by leaders. The extent of war prevention is also referred to as a diplomatic vs. military solution, with no reference to any other possible route. There is talk of war leaders being devoid of pragmatism and an inability to work towards peace… It is also suggested that war does not bring victory as aggressors who start wars rarely emerge as victors and that we need to create conditions that required cool heads. Nice words. But how does it all translate into reality? That is, prevent unprovoked or unnecessary wars from starting in the first place?
Are we ignoring strong trauma-based hints? Trauma features playing out in real life can become deadly if we remain ignorant of them (e.g., Miller, 1990). These markers often go unnoticed.
Vreÿ’s (2011) study of Stoessinger (2010) on Why Nations Go to War mentions three points. First, war leaders rarely emerge as winners. Second, Misperceptions is pivotal in outbreaks of war. And third, leaders’ personalities is crucial. This last point resonates with this article: wars are often decided by individuals, not faceless entities, and their decisions can result in needless suffering before any eventual accountability. But is this simply coincidental? To delve deeper into the question of whether war language is trauma language in disguise, I will employ two of Vreÿ’s insights derived from Stoessinger’s case studies.
The following two thinking styles, typical of warmongering leaders, were derived directly from Vreÿ (2011) making sense of Stoessinger’s (2010) case studies on Why Nations Go to War. Each is paired with insights informed by trauma research that offer potential warnings, highlighting areas for possible intervention and suggesting alternative narratives to conflict. These insights are not definitive, but open to further interpretation by anyone with a basic understanding of trauma. By adopting such a perspective, we may uncover crucial entry points for preventing war.
Expectation of a swift and decisive victory.
Poor emotional regulation and impulse control are trauma features and can be seen in people who have experienced trauma, whether intergenerational or ancestral trauma is also present. One potential maladaptation to trauma is a loss of core capacities for self-regulation which can include impulsive behaviours (Cook et al, 2005). For instance, highly impulsive college students report being exposed to more traumatic events over their lifetime than students with less impulsivity (Netto et al., 2016). A meta-analysis by Liu (2019) found a positive association between childhood maltreatment and general trait impulsivity. In the context of an unprovoked or unnecessary war, the mental attitude of a leader might be imagined as “Let’s do this. It will be over in just a few days”. Such an impulsive outlook on war, anticipating a win within days, might hint at underlying difficulties with emotional regulation, a known trauma response feature. If a leader has poor impulse control or poor emotional regulation, that can be a clear warning signal attached to that leader who is deciding to take their country into an unnecessary war. Early identification and appropriate support, including trauma treatment, could equip and empower leaders to manage impulses and make rational decisions that safeguard national security. A leader’s expectation of an easy victory, often rooted in unresolved trauma and impulsivity, presents a critical opportunity for early intervention and thereby war prevention.
Holding a distorted view of their adversary.
Until traumatised individuals gain control over their memories, emotions, and expectations, their past can hijack or hinder their capacity to create better lives including the possibility of initiating unnecessary wars. A leader who holds on to a belief system that is distorted and not based in reality regarding his perceived adversaries may risk taking his country into an unnecessary war if there are enough key people in his country who agree and support him. Such a leader might communicate a distorted view of the perceived enemy, declaring, “I know how dangerous they are, so let’s strike first and show them who’s boss”. This thinking style could be reflective of a variety of trauma-based elements pertaining to individuals who remain living in their past, i.e., holding on to a distorted view of their perceived adversary. This distorted worldview can encompass themselves, their enemies, and their future prospects which can carry tragic consequences. Research by Briere (1996) shows that trauma can warp an individual’s cognitive processes, altering how they perceive themselves and the world around them. This in turn can change the schema with which they perceive themselves and interpret external realities. Rather than allowing themselves to feel helpless or hopeless and seek help for such feelings, it can lead to hyper-vigilance of danger in a war-attracted leader’s inner world which may or may not exist in their external world (e.g., see Briere & Spinazzola, 2005). Therefore, a leader’s distorted view of their adversary, a potential consequence of unresolved trauma, can have disastrous consequences. This hyper-vigilance may fuel needless aggression, and escalate tensions toward an unnecessary war.
Conclusion: The question of whether war language is actually trauma language in disguise is not merely fair but crucial, demanding exploration. Translating the language of war to reveal untreated and unprocessed trauma (and grief) may become a powerful and legitimate method for preventing war. The transformative potential of this approach, offers a new reason for hope. Refining and validating this promising framework through further research is crucial for paving the way toward a more peaceful future. Asking trauma-informed questions can be a valuable starting point.
This article was originally published in Mind Cafe, February, 2024, Issue 97.
References
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Miller, A. (1990). The Untouched Key: Tracing Childhood Trauma in Creativity and Destructiveness. New York: Doubleday.
Netto, L. R., Pereira, J. L., Nogueira, J. F., Cavalcanti-Ribeiro, P., Santana, R. C., Teles, C. A., Quarantini, L. C. (2016). Impulsivity is relevant for trauma exposure and PTSD symptoms in a non-clinical population. Psychiatry Research, 239, 204–211.
Stoessinger, J. G. (2010). Why Nations Go to War. (11th Edition). Publ. Cengage Learning.
Vreÿ, F. (2011). Why Nations Go To War/John G. Stoessinger. Scientia Militaria South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 38, Nr 2. (August, 2011). Military Strategy Department, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.
